Passing notes on M.Kundrotas

(By The Galiorka Colleague, concerning his two articles: the more recent one, called “Laisvei – taip, brukimui – ne”, and the one where he expounds on his model of what are feelings.)

1. Kundrotas’ theory of virtues suffers from the same flaw as, in his vision, the instrumental reason: it is a meta theory, so it needs a “master”, and obtains it in the form of uncommunicable religious dogma or alternatively in the form of mere emotion that, processed so, gets to masquerade as reason until he carries out the endless determent, the effect of which he would know from Derrida if he wasn’t busy bashing postmodernism – the effect of aporia of parousia [meaning ever-arriving, never-here].

2. Feelings come with their own rationality of value systems, that mind of a perceived pervert merely observes, practicing humility of socratic ignorance, first listens and only then rejects; an “immoral person” asks his emotion first: my friend, for what purpose did you come? – even if the guest has arrived with a legion of card-carrying devils. [I.e. as Jesus meets Judas – a scene from which B.Pascal deduces that audiatur et altera pars is obligatory in Christianity.]

3. A notion is an emotion; say, Lithuania is an emotion of homesickness, a “field of mercy” in Buddhist terms, that served the purpose of staying sane to Maironis, Vydūnas, J.Aistis, most importantly S.Nėris, J.Marcinkevičius, who rather cultivated it for the good of others. (What would J.Marcinkevičius feel as something that drives him insane? Isn’t he’s rather morally simplistic, disappointingly wholesome? – Answer should be: wash your mouth, when he was a kiddo, Holocaust took place. – Also compare my other take on him.)

4. If the system actually works the way M.Kundrotas describes, it’s more accurate to say that the system infantilizes rather than condoing pleasures; if that’s the case, then to discourage people from playing along with their intense passions equals to help system infantilize.

5. What he calls feelings is ultimately yay or nay, which is the American version of feelings – basically grades of euphoria or dysphoria (and Aristotle is not better in that, while Plato at least is aware that some feelings are atopoi.)